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Both Jerry Mashaw's "Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism,"' and
R. Shep Melnick's "Federalism and the New Rights"2 examine the definition
of entitlement, and consider to what extent block grants are consistent with the
notion of entitlement. In this commentary, I will first highlight that their
examinations arrive at fairly different conclusions; then second, consider what
we can learn from these divergent examinations; and, finally, challenge us to
think not only about the effect of downward devolution, but also the effect of
privatization or outward devolution on representative democracy.
Mashaw suggests that federal categorical grant requirements denote an
entitlement for specified populations. Therefore, we could design programs
which are funded through a block grant process and, not inconsistently, also
specify entitlement requirements for particular groups of peopleMelnick
argues that there was a subtle judicial transformation of grants-in-aid to the
states into entitlement for individuals. He claims that Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), for example, was not an "entitlement" program
when it was first enacted. According to Melnick, the Aid to Dependent
Children statute at that time was silent on almost all eligibility issues.3 Let me
address Melnick's argument first.
While significant latitude was given to the states, the federal government
specified from the very beginning that the program was set up for single
mothers. There was very clear legislative intent that single mothers-who were
primarily thought of (and were) widows-were deserving of cash assistance.4
In this sense, the federal government had a lot to say about who was
categorically eligible. It was quite clear in setting the parameters of eligibility:
the program wasn't for poor people, but selected types of poor people.
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As mentioned above, the federal government allowed significant state
discretion, but it was discretion for determining who was eligible within this
category of single women and their dependent children. Eligibility was
typically decided by the local welfare case worker, who would decide on a
case-by-case basis whether a particular family was "worthy" of assistance.
Many researchers have documented that race often played a role in case worker
determinations, as well as individual perceptions of moral character.5
The Supreme Court decisions from 1968 to 1972 that Melnick refers to
were in large part addressing the arbitrary nature in which states determined
who among the federally defined categorical group were eligible for benefits.
While these decisions were extremely important, I don't think they served to
transform AFDC into an entitlement program. Court action simply reinforced
the entitlement that was specified for a select group of people when the
program was enacted. Although my view is consistent with Mashaw's
definition of entitlement, Melnick's examination importantly speaks to the
meaning of such a broad definition of entitlement. While federal categorical
specifications denote entitlement status (such specifications suggest legislative
intent that a specified group of people are entitled to benefits under the
program in mind and provide legal protection to defend the "rights" defined),
this entitlement intent is often rendered meaningless without litigation. In this
sense, I agree with Melnick that it was litigation that truly turned AFDC into
an individual entitlement. However, I would not take this argument as far as
Melnick when he suggests that the individual entitlement is largely a creation
of the federal courts.6 The federal government needs to specify the categorical
requirements and provide the legal protection in the first place.
If the federal government needs to specify categorical requirements for
programs to maintain an individual entitlement, important questions about how
block grants change existing notions of entitlement arise. Mashaw argues that
moving to block grants does not have to mean a discontinuation of entitlement.
He provides useful illustrations of how entitlements take different forms under
varying cooperative financing schemes. For example, he points out how the
National Governors' Association's 1996 Medicaid reform proposals preserves
existing entitlements for primary beneficiaries, but makes these entitlements
enforceable only through state administrative and judicial institutions.7
However, although we can call this an entitlement, the term may be misleading
since we would then have fifty-one different court interpretations of a Medicaid
entitlement. Thus, it is important to consider which particular requirements are
necessary to ensure that a meaningful entitlement is continued. For example,
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is a federal categorical requirement in which states are allowed to determine
which type of persons within this specified group are eligible (teen mother
restrictions), or which type of persons are eligible for which type of services
(workfare programs), an entitlement program?
This notion of whether block grants should have particular requirements
attached to them to achieve a meaningful entitlement really depends on our
assessment of what states will do under block grants. Melnick argues that under
a block grant, states will do what they have been doing recently: "More work
requirements, more time limits, 'wedfare,' 'learnfare,' residency requirements
of dubious constitutionality-all these will proliferate." 8 Underlying these
recent welfare reform efforts is a consideration of the moral character of
AFDC recipients-judging some recipients to be worthy and others not.
Depending on the capacity of state governments to assess "objectively" who
fits into their newly defined categories, the determination of eligibility could
be quite arbitrary-and could be disturbingly similar to the early days of
AFDC. Indeed, many of these "new" behavioral modification programs require
individual assessments by case workers: Can the mother work? What are her
day care needs? Can the teen mother live with her parents?
This concern about state-defined eligibility criteria is related to the "race
to the bottom" debate. During the two-day symposium, we heard a number of
variations on the term "race"-walk, wobble, slide-but no suggestions for
revising the term "bottom." The implication is that we know what the bottom
is. Martha Derthick alluded to this in her talk by saying "we won't have the
data to determine whether we're at the bottom."' But, again, the implication
is that if we had the right data, we would know what the bottom is. Of course,
this is a normative question: restrictions on AFDC benefits to teen mothers, for
example, is an innovative reform to some, a representation of a laggard state
to others.
To objectify this notion of the bottom, we tend to think about states'
financial commitment-as long as states maintain the same level of financial
commitment, they are not (according to this definition) moving toward the
bottom. To judge the way in which states use their money would be to question
the whole point of devolution of authority. What disallows us from questioning
what states do is the presumption that an increase in state political authority
over jointly funded programs enhances representative democracy. But whether
or not an entitlement is present under a block grant has important implications
with regard to recipient representation. As Mashaw points out, the elimination
of an entitlement under block grants takes power away from individuals and
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gives it to state government. Under an entitlement, beneficiaries "may choose
what cases to pursue, what remedies to request, and which court system will
hear their claims."" ° Moreover, under an entitlement, all categorically eligible
recipients should be represented equally. Is it only the preferences of the
broader state citizenry that matter under block grants? How will recipients be
represented? Addressing these questions about representation is equally, if not
more, important than simple financial assessments in determining whether
states have (or will) digress.
The representation question is not only important when thinking about
downward devolution, but outward devolution as well. As states privatize their
public programs, is power going to the people or to private entities? This is
particularly important in state Medicaid programs as many states move toward
some form of managed care where private Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) are asked to assume the risk of providing medical services to
individual Medicaid recipients. Here recipient representation is realized through
their articulation of health plan choice. Obviously, there are serious concerns
about representation when many states report that around half of their
recipients do not exercise their option to choose and are assigned to plans.
Moreover, the fact that many states contract with private, nationally-based
companies raises significant questions as to whether downward devolution
produces public policies that more closely align with local preferences. For
example, to what extent do national companies customize their services to meet
local needs?
Because representation is an important component of individual rights, it
is crucial for us to give more thought to (1) the different emerging forms of
representation in the states; (2) whether some forms of representation need to
be protected for individuals; and (3) how representation is articulated under
various state privatization efforts.
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